Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2003

A Few Reflections on the Model Penal Code Commentaries
Kent Greenawalt
Columbia Law School, kgreen@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Kent Greenawalt, A Few Reflections on the Model Penal Code Commentaries, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 241
(2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3458

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

A Few Reflections on the Model Penal
Code Commentaries
Kent Greenawalt*
When Deborah Denno invited me to participate in the panel of the Association of
American Law Schools discussing possible revision of the Model Penal Code, I
initially declined, not having taught criminal law for more than two decades and
having written only sporadically in the field. Professor Denno urged that as one
involved in the revision of the Commentary, I might nonetheless have something to
contribute. In these reflections, as at the session, I have mainly restricted myself to
the relationship between the final commentary and the Code itself.
As Gerard Lynch's essay explains,' the Model Penal Code was the fruit of work
during the 1950s, and its intellectual roots can be traced back to the late 1930s when
Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, in A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,
developed a systematic utilitarian approach to that central aspect of the criminal law.'
Other scholars made very considerable contributions, but the Model Code was
decidedly the product of Professor Wechsler's vision. Although he was a utilitarian,3
his utilitarianism was highly nuanced, encompassing not only multiple reasons for
condemnation and punishment, but the fundamental idea that no criminal code should
drift too radically from the public's sense of wrongful behavior and of degrees of
wrongdoing. This sensitivity helps to explain why most provisions of the Code can,
as Judge Lynch points out, fit a "just deserts" deontological approach to criminal
liability.
As the sections of the Code proceeded through a highly distinguished Criminal
Law Advisory Committee and the entire membership of the American Law Institute
("A.L.I."), they were accompanied by commentaries. These were fullest in respect to
action, culpability, justification, excuse, accessorial liability, and other key portions of
the General Part, as well as a few specific crimes, most notably the levels of homicide.
For many specific crimes and matters such as jurisdiction, the original commentary
was thinner-not infrequently, much thinner. Scholars interested in seeing what any
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Gerard Lynch, Revising the ModelPenal Code: KeepingItReal, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219,219
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Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationaleof the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV.

701, 1261 (1937).
3 I recall as a student in his criminal law class in the spring of 1961 suggesting after class that
utilitarian considerations might be qualified by deontological concerns, an approach I had learned under
H.L.A. Hart at Oxford. However he might have responded given more time and a fuller presentation,
Wechsler then saw no merit in the position.
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comments looked like when proposed sections were being considered by the A.L.I.
can find out by consulting the Tentative Drafts.
The Model Code was approved formally in the spring of 1962, with the
commentary in various stages of finality. During the following year, Wechsler
became Executive Director of the A.L.I., undertaking a heavy burden of new
responsibilities. However that job might otherwise have been conceived, he took an
active part in the detail of all the codes and Restatements on which the organization
was working. During the 1960s and 1970s, he was also involved in promoting
practical criminal law reform, playing an especially important role in New York's
revision. A painstaking writer ofprecision, elegance, and eloquence, Wechsler's gifts
did not suit his turning out large amounts of commentary in the midst of all his other
endeavors. The project of updating and completing the commentary bogged down.
During the late 1960s, Wechsler enlisted Peter Low to help revise the comments.
Professor Low produced a substantial amount of work of high quality on the General
Part. In the mid-1970s, the A.L.I. applied to the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration for a grant to complete the commentaries. With receipt of the grant
began the final effort at completion, successful except for provisions regarding
treatment and corrections, as to which the Code's approach had been largely
overtaken by developments since 1962.
At this stage, the ambition for the comments had become not only to clarify
exactly what various provisions were designed to accomplish, and to defend their
approaches against possible alternatives, but also to explicate how the states and
federal government had reacted in adopted and proposed revisions. By the period
during which most of the new research was done, there had been over thirty
completed revisions, and a number of proposed revisions were pending. Figuring out
just what each of these provided with respect to a host of discrete particulars was not a
simple matter.
Peter Low, as Reporter, and John Jeffries, as Associate Reporter, undertook the
daunting task of covering all the specific crimes. Marvina Halberstam was Reporter
for the preliminary subjects-such as territorial applicability, time limitations, and
double jeopardy-covered by Article I. Sanford Fox was Associate Reporter for the
two sentencing articles. I was to bring Low's work on the General Part up to date and
review the contributions of the others. Although my formal title was Chief Reporter
for Revision of the Commentaries, no one harbored any illusion about who was really
the final editor. Herbert Wechsler participated powerfully through the project's life;
he read everything carefully, and nothing appeared that did not have his approval.
Given his authorship of much of the Code itself, this degree of involvement was not
only appropriate, but fortuitous.
Our collective responsibility was to revise the comments. We had no authority to
touch the content of the Code, and our work was not reviewed by the A.L.I. We did
alter a few punctuation marks, and Professor Wechsler having been persuaded that the
Code had engaged in blatant disregard of the "which-that" rule, I whiled away a
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number of stimulating hours ferreting out "whiches" to convert to "thats. ' 4 But
essentially we took the Code as given, a constraint that made perfect sense, since the
1962 Code had the authority of the whole American Law Institute, and states had been
using it since that time.
These realities affected our approach to the comments we were revising. When
extensive comments had preceded adoption of the Code provisions, providing
explanations and justifications, we kept them with very little alteration, concentrating
mainly on revisions following the Code and perhaps offering a few additional
clarifications. When the original comments were sparing, as with much of Part II, the
revisers had to be more creative. But even then, we almost always tried to provide a
reasoned justification for what the Code did. We noted some scholarly developments
after the 1950s, but our efforts in that respect were much more limited than our
updating of practical developments in jurisdictions revising their criminal laws.
Although the comments on sentencing did include a discussion of the movement
toward "just deserts," at no point did we try to address the whole Code's merits and
possible flaws against understandings that were heavily deontological, represented by
writings such as John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), Ronald Dworkin's Taking
Rights Seriously (1977), and, in criminal law, George Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal
Law (1978). We rarely said explicitly that a Code provision was misconceived or
seriously out of date. The acknowledgment that a gender neutral approach to sexual
crimes might be preferable to the Code's own, quoted by Professor Denno, 5 was quite
unusual.
Thus, our task was rather uncommon. Trying to describe practical developments
fully and pay modest attention to new scholarship, we attempted during the late 1970s
to give reasoned support for choices made two decades earlier. A reader of the
comments provided for those sections for which the original comments had not been
extensive must understand them as this strange hybrid. None of us, not even
Wechsler, was attempting a reflective assessment of whether we, in the 1970s, would
have adopted exactly what the Code provides.
I have little to add to what the other essayists say about possible revision in the
near future. I agree with Professor Denno's challenge to the provisions on sexual
crimes, and I think Kenneth Simons has identified serious perplexities about the
nuances of mental states.6 But Judge Lynch persuades me that for purposes of
My understanding is that if a phrase is parenthetical, "which" is appropriate; if the phrase is
necessary to explain what object one is talking about, "that" should be used. Thus, "He stayed in his
room, which was painted blue"; "he was able to choose among different balloons of various colors and
picked the one that was blue." Believing that because the "rule" was very widely not followed and the
Code had been quoted for years with the misguided "whiches," I opposed their extirpation, but I was
overruled.
5 Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model PenalCode's Sexual Offense ProvisionsShould Be Pulled
and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2003).
6 Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1
OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003). I raise some problems with justification and accessorial sections in
Kent Greenawalt, A Vice ofltsVirtues: The Perilsof Precisionin CriminalCodification, As Illustrated
by Retreat, GeneralJustification, and Dangerous Utterances, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 929 (1988).
4
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practical reform, attention is best directed at specific crimes that the Code omits
altogether or treats in a manner that has ceased to be defensible.7 Lynch offers
powerful reasons for pessimism about the prospects of comprehensive code reform.
Criminal law scholars are much more divided about desirable approaches than they
were in the 1950s, and even among centrist scholars, no one person now has the
distinctive stature that Herbert Wechsler enjoyed. No doubt, improvements may be
made in many of the Code's provisions, including those at its core, but whether a
concentrated effort, with input from a number of scholars, would produce
formulations that, overall, improve on the 1962 Code is doubtful. Paul Robinson and
Michael Cahill make a strong argument about the possible political benefits of an
updated authoritative code adopted by the A.L.I.; 8 but my own sense is that that
argument is not sufficient to justify a comprehensive reform of the Model Penal Code,
rather than focused concentration on the specific crimes for which a modem treatment
is urgently needed.

7

I put aside the provisions on sentencing, which the A.L.I. is already revising.
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Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the Statesfrom

Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM L. 169 (2003).

